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SOCIAL ACTION
Abstract:
Since the 1960s, the later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein has had a marked influence on the 
social sciences. As an important sub-field, the sociology of science has drawn extensively 
on the Wittgenstein and he has become a key reference point in debates in the philosophy 
of the social sciences about structure and agency. There, a number of commentators have 
employed Wittgenstein’s ‘sceptical paradox’ to demonstrate that the dualistic account of 
social reality provided by major figures in contemporary social theory, such as Giddens, 
Bourdieu, Bhaskar and Habermas, are unsustainable; they are hopelessly individualist. This 
paper acknowledges the importance of Wittgenstein but maintains that a critique of 
contemporary social theory consonant with the ‘sceptical paradox’ was already present in 
the sociological canon: in the form of Parsons’ utilitarian dilemma in The Structure of 
Social Action. This paper seeks to recover the utilitarian dilemma for current debates in 
order to demonstrate the enduring relevance of Parsons. The paper goes on to argue that not 
only did Parsons provide a critique of individualism compatible with Wittgenstein’s but 
that he actually transcended it. 
Key words: utilitarian dilemma, individualism, sceptical paradox, forms of life, 
common values
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Introduction
In the late 1970s, Anthony Giddens claimed that in the course of the twentieth century there 
had been a convergence of philosophy and sociology (1976). More precisely, sociology had 
become, especially after the linguistic turn of the 1960s, increasingly influenced by the 
later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Peter Winch’s famous book on Wittgenstein (1977) was 
an important but far from isolated example of this attempt to bridge between the 
disciplines. Indeed, Giddens’ importance lay very substantially in his connecting 
potentially parochial British sociology with wider currents of European social thought, 
including Wittgenstein. Of course, sociology had, in fact, always been closely related to 
and, perhaps, even indistinguishable philosophy from its earliest origins. Marx, Weber and 
Durkheim all actively addressed philosophical questions about the nature of social reality 
and drew upon Hegel, Kant and Dilthey in their work. The sociology of the Frankfurt 
School remained resolutely philosophical from the 1930s onwards. Rather than arguing that 
philosophy and sociology began to merge in the late twentieth century, it may be more 
sustainable to argue that a particular kind of philosophy – namely Wittgensteinian – began 
to have a huge and novel influence. Reflecting Wittgenstein’s importance as an intellectual 
resource, there has been extensive exegesis which has drawn connections between 
Wittgenstein work – and especially his later philosophy – and other major social theorists. 
Thus, Kitching (1988) and Rubinstein (1981) have highlighted the parallels between 
Wittgenstein’s later work and Marx’s theory of praxis and David Bloor (1997) has similarly 
pointed up the close connection between Emile Durkheim’s analysis of ritual and 
Wittgenstein’s theory of rule-following as a social activity.
There have been evident benefits to this Wittgensteinian influence; the focus on 
situated social practice has encouraged the production of extremely fruitful lines of 
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research. Indeed, it might be argued that various sub-fields, not least the sociology of 
science and technology, would not have appeared without sociologists’ growing interest in 
Wittgenstein. There have been other areas of research where his influence has been 
paramount. In the past twenty years, the theme of structure and agency has been a 
fundamental issue in contemporary social theory; there has been extensive ontological 
debate about whether social reality should be understood in dualistic terms. Wittgenstein 
has been a prominent, even decisive, reference point in these debates utilised by both 
proponents and detractors of structure and agency. Ted Schatzki, Nigel Pleasants and 
Stephen Turner have all drawn on Wittgenstein to criticise the major figures in this 
literature such as Anthony Giddens, Pierre Bourdieu, Roy Bhaskar and Jurgen Habermas. 
The convergence of philosophy and especially Wittgensteinian philosophy and 
sociology is a fact. The discipline may be stronger for it. However, it is not clear that 
sociologists’ current deference to and even dependence upon Wittgenstein is necessary. 
There may be resources within the recognised canon of sociology which would provide as 
equally a valid critique of the structure and agency paradigm, as Wittgenstein’s later work. 
In particular, it may be possible to identify the kinds of arguments which commentators 
like Schatzki utilise from Wittgenstein in works already existing in sociology. The early 
work of Talcott Parsons may be decisive here. Talcott Parsons and especially his early great 
work, The Structure of Social Theory, may remain useful and relevant for overcoming 
current problems in contemporary social theory. 
The claim that Parsons offers scholars similar intellectual tools as Wittgenstein 
seems unlikely. For the most part, social theorists have actively regarded the two figures as 
antithetical. John Heritage (1984), for instance, uses a Wittgensteinian approach to justify 
ethnomethodology against Parsons’ structural-functionalism. Yet, a connection between the 
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two intellectuals has been noted albeit infrequently. Jeffrey Alexander, for instance, has 
emphasised the commonalities between them: ‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, 
composed over roughly the same period, questions rationalistic theories from a remarkably 
similar point of view and proposes a conventionalised and interpretive alternative that 
exhibits distinctive parallels to Parsons’ own’ (Alexander 1988: 100) . Although deeply 
suggestive, Alexander has not elaborated upon the point. Given their very different 
personal backgrounds, intellectual styles and their apparently divergent perspectives, this 
failing is understandable. Indeed, it may be a more unusual and problematic project to 
attempt to draw a convergence between them now. Certainly, many commentators, such as 
John Holmwood, would regard the project as mis-guided. Nevertheless, as The Structure of 
Social Action demonstrated, the benefits of illustrating unseen parallels can be great. 
Roland Robertson has himself noted, ‘the challenge is to do the work which Parsons began. 
This must mean that Parsons’ work has to be critically elaborated…extended and refined 
analytically and used with respect to empirical and historic problems’ (Robertson 1982: 
283; Turner 1991: 246). The purpose of this paper is to follow Robertson’s injunction and 
to engage with Parsons’ work critically in order to highlight its connection to 
Wittgenstein’s later writing.
However, by exploring the convergence between the work of the late Wittgenstein 
and the early Parsons, the purpose here is not merely of academic interest, pointing up a 
seldom recognised theoretical convergence. Nor is it a matter merely of ensuring that 
Parsons’ is given his intellectual dues. Rather the argument which will be forwarded here is 
that in The Structure of Social Action, not only did Parsons propose a philosophical critique 
of utilitarianism which accorded with Wittgenstein’s critique of rule-following but that, in 
sociological terms, his account was superior. Parsons provided a sociological explanation 
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of why humans necessarily engaged in collective rule-following in the manner which 
Wittgenstein described. By re-discovering classical sociology, it may be possible to 
establish sociology in the new millennium on the sound footing which Parsons sought in 
1937, ‘sixty years ahead of its time’ (Gould 1991). 
Contemporary Social Theory
In recent writings, a number of commentators have highlighted a consensus emerging in 
the social sciences over the last three decades which they have variously called ‘critical 
social theory’ (Pleasants 1999), ‘contemporary social theory’ (King 2004) or the ‘theory of 
practices’ (Turner 1994; Schatzki 1987, 1997). On this account, contemporary social 
thought (led by Giddens, Bourdieu, Bhaskar and Habermas) has been increasingly 
dominated by an adherence to ontological dualism. Social reality is understood in terms of 
structure and agency. Society consists, in the first instance, of individuals, whose agency 
and consciousness, must be recognized. However, collectively, the actions of individuals 
produce social phenomena which are not reducible to the individual. Social reality has 
emergent properties; institutions, for instance, pre-exist and have determination over the 
individual even though these institutions could not exist without the individuals of which 
they are comprised. Society is, consequently, dependent upon the actions and beliefs of 
individuals but not finally reducible to them. One of the most important questions for social 
theorists, oriented to this dualistic perspective, is to explain how emergent social structures 
are reproduced by the individuals who comprise them. For contemporary social theorists, 
rules are central to the explanation of emergence and structural reproduction. In order to 
engage in social practices appropriate to the reproduction of institutions and the creation of 
emergent properties, individuals follow rules, either knowingly or instinctively, which are 
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drawn from or compatible with the institutions of which they are part (Sawyer 2005). 
Consequently, instantiating these rules, individuals regulate their own actions so that 
cumulatively, they reproduce existing social structures. Rules guide and direct individual 
action so that a multiplicity of individuals all acting independently can be united in order to 
produce coherent, though unintended, consequences; knowledgeable individuals effectively 
reproduce society unknowingly.
Ted Schatzki has highlighted the way in which Giddens’ structuration theory and 
Bourdieu’s theory of ‘practice’ represent two prominent examples of this approach to social 
theory. According to Schatzki, both theorists are concerned with explaining how the 
individual reproduces an emergent social system which transcends individual belief, 
understanding and action. In order to explain this systemic reproduction, Giddens appeals 
to the existence of ‘structure’ consisting of a ‘virtual order of differences’ (a set of tacit 
rules) which orient individual practice. Whenever individuals act, they instantiate the rules 
of structure, just as an English-speaker reaffirms English whenever they speak. 
Instantiating these unacknowledged rules, individuals in social life are therefore able to act 
in a coherent manner. They are able to stretch their presence over time and space through a 
cycle of recurrent routine. In a famous elision, Giddens maintains that this instantiation of 
rules affirms not only the existence of ‘structure’ as a set of rules but the social system as 
well.
One of the main propositions of structuration theory is that the rules and resources 
drawn upon in the production and reproduction of social action are at the same time 
the means of system reproduction (duality of structure). 
                                                                                             (Giddens 1995: 19)
There is, in effect, duality of system. Structure, as virtual rules, and system, as institutions, 
are conveniently conflated in the acting individual, so that individuals reproduce the system 
(Archer 1982). 
6
Similarly, Bourdieu advocates the concept of the habitus as a ‘structuring structure’ 
which informs social action often independently of individual consciousness. As a result, 
the individual engages predictably in the distinctive social practices which are essential to 
the reproduction of class hierarchies; individuals demonstrate an ‘amor fati’ where they are 
drawn inexorably along particular lines of practice in order to sustain the class structure 
(Bourdieu, 1984: 244). For Schatzki, Giddens’s concept of structure, as a ‘virtual order of 
differences’, and Bourdieu’s definition of the habitus, as a ‘structuring structure’, are 
equivalent. In both cases, individuals, as independent agents, apply rules in order to engage 
in regular social activity, thereby reproducing the social system. The system (as a structure) 
is reproduced by individuals through the mediation of rules. Stephen Turner (1994) has 
similarly emphasised the key role which ‘practices’, not as actions but as tacit rules, play in 
contemporary social theory.
In fact, the theoretical convergence of structure and agency extends well beyond 
Giddens and Bourdieu. As Pleasants has discussed (1999), Roy Bhaskar has explicitly 
drawn a parallel between his own Transformational Model of Social Action and Giddens’ 
structuration theory. Like structuration theory, TMSA conceives of social reality as 
consisting of structure and agency. The individuals on Bhaskar’s realist model knowingly 
follow social rules and understandings in order to act meaningfully. Pleasants maintains 
that Habermas also understands society in terms of a system and autonomous individuals, 
who enact purposive-rational codes. Yet, even in his description of communicative action, 
when the distorted communication of the purposive codes is rectified, Habermas’ 
individuals still follow rules. The work of Giddens, Bourdieu, Bhaskar and Habermas is 
among the most prominent in contemporary social theory but a similar approach to 
individual rule-following can be detected in work as diverse as Foucault and Luhmann 
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(King 2004). In each case, as Schatzki, Pleasants and Turner have highlighted, social 
reality is now widely understood to consist of structure and agency. Individual agency is 
regulated through the application of rules to facilitate the reproduction of emergent social 
structures. Rules mediate between the social structure and the individual.
The Sceptical Paradox
‘Critical social theorists’, like Giddens and Bourdieu, have often drawn upon a false 
reading of Wittgenstein’s comments on rule-following in order to forward the structure and 
agency paradigm. They have interpreted Wittgenstein’s rule-following comments as 
evidence for their position. Ironically, Ludwig Wittgenstein has been a key resource for 
critics of this paradigm as well; Pleasants, for instance, attempts ‘to show that 
Wittgenstein’s critique of traditional philosophy can be extended – to critical social theory’ 
(Pleasants 1999: 10). Against the interpretation of Wittgenstein’s account of rule-following, 
which Pleasants identifies in contemporary social theory, David Bloor has been prominent 
in proposing an alternative reading.1 Bloor maintains that Wittgenstein’s later work is 
primarily motivated by a critique of ‘meaning determinism’ or ‘rule-individualism’ (Bloor 
1997: 3-4; 1983: 3). According to this approach, words have a singular meaning which 
defines their use in any situation. Individuals learn this meaning and apply the words 
accordingly. The meaning acts as a rule which the individually applies in every subsequent 
case. The philosopher’s job is to identify those rules which determine meaning in order to 
adjudicate on proper linguistic usage, distinguishing sense from nonsense. 
For Bloor, one of the prime purposes of Philosophical Investigations was to 
illustrate the fallacy of rule-individualist philosophy. Philosophical Investigations focused 
1 Bloor’s reading is itself deeply controversial. It is engendered much debate e.g. Lynch 1992, 1993; Kusch 
2004. Indeed, Pleasants himself as developed an alternative understanding of the concept of scepticism; 
proposing that Wittgenstein questions any general sociologically theorising.
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on the issue of language use but, according to Bloor, the work has profound significance 
for the philosophy of the social sciences much more generally. The rule-individualist 
fallacy is applicable to all forms of rule-following, not just language use; it is relevant to all 
forms of social practice. The point which Bloor takes as central to later Wittgenstein is that 
rule-following is a social institution requiring collective understanding and agreement; it 
cannot be conducted alone. Meaning is finite; limited by established social practice and 
public agreement. Individuals do not apply rules independently but rather as members of 
language communities in reference to each other.
 In his collaboration with Barry Barnes as they developed their ‘strong programme’ 
(e.g. Barnes, Bloor and French 1996), David Bloor has applied the concept of meaning 
finitism to the question of scientific research to demonstrate that science cannot be 
characterised as the rational march of logic. Rather, at decisive points in science, 
researchers reach impasses when it is not clear how to go on; evidence is ambiguous and 
could be interpreted in a multiplicity of ways. Moreover, there are no criteria to adjudicate 
between competing evidence claims since the appropriate criteria of judgement are 
precisely the issue under dispute. At this point, scientists are not guided by the evidence but 
by social factors; above all, they are guided by the arbitrary (but not random or 
meaningless) institutional goals which they as a research community have set themselves. 
These shared goals, not given by natural reality, but by distributions of power and interest 
with the research community decide ultimately how evidence should be interpreted and 
indeed what should count as evidence. Science proceeds by a series of ‘boot-strapped 
inductions’, where self-referential presumptions, are central to claims about reality (Barnes 
1983).
David Bloor’s and Barry Barnes’ work draws upon and is closely related to Saul 
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Kripke’s celebrated interpretation of the Philosophical Investigations (1982). There, Kripke 
identified the essential argument against an individualistic account of rule-following in a 
famous paragraph in the Philosophical Investigations which has become known as the 
‘sceptical paradox’ (Kripke 1982: 4).
This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because 
every course of action can be made out to accord with the rules. The answer was: if 
everything can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to 
conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here.
(Wittgenstein 1976: §201)
For Wittgenstein, the fundamental picture of individual rule-following was flawed. If an 
individual followed a linguistic rule alone, a myriad of practices could be developed from 
it. If individuals followed a rule independently, then they could theoretically invest a rule 
with a multitude of significances. Alternatively, for any specific practice a multitude of 
rules could be invoked as an explanation. Wittgenstein usefully illustrates his position in a 
very simple example. The Philosophical Investigations is organised as a Socratic dialectic 
with Wittgenstein engaging with an interlocutor. During the discussion of rule-following, 
the interlocutor gives a standard account of rule following: ‘A rule stands there like a sign-
post’ (Wittgenstein 1976: §85). Given the existence of a rule, it is self-evident what action 
is implies. Individuals follow rules, just as they follow a sign-post. Wittgenstein rejects this 
account; ‘Does the sign-post leave no doubt open about the way I have to go? Does it shew 
which direction I am to take when I have passed it; whether along the road or the footpath 
or cross-country?’ (Wittgenstein 1976: §85). A sign-post has less determination about how 
a traveller should interpret it, than is typically supposed. The sign-post does not necessarily 
show the way to go on. 
Kripke gives the apparently self-evident example of a mathematical equation: 
68+57=125 (Kripke 1982: 8). The rules of addition seem to dictate this answer. However, 
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this answer does not universally hold. In the past, Kripke could have been ‘quusing’ rather 
than adding recording every answer over 57 as 5 (Kripke 1982: 9).  In this case 68+57 
would be recorded as equalling 5. Kripke’s point is that although empirically it is utterly 
self-evident how to proceed (and the ‘quuser’ would, he admits, need to be insane or under 
the influence of LSD), there is always the philosophical possibility that an alternative 
sequence could be followed. An individual could always theoretically appeal to various 
contingencies to explain why a rule had been applied in a different way. Indeed, an adder 
can never prove to the radical sceptic that they were not quusing in the past. That 
theoretical possibility demonstrates a vital but consistently overlooked fact about rule-
following. Individual rule-following could never in and of itself produce regular and 
predictable action. No matter how self-evident rule-following appears to be, an individual 
could always theoretically follow even the most apparently rigid rules differently. 
Philosophically, it is never obvious how a rule should be followed by an individual. 
Commentators, like Schatzki and Pleasants, have utilised Wittgenstein’s sceptical 
paradox to reject the rule-following model typical in contemporary social theory. 
Accordingly, Schatzki and Pleasants assess the central claim that regular social practices 
can be understood in terms of the application of rules by individuals. Drawing on 
Wittgenstein, they argue that it is impossible to understand social practices in terms of the 
application of rules by the individual. They identify two interrelated fallacies of this 
account. 
Knowing how to go on is a mastery of ways of speaking and acting that defies 
adequate representation in words, symbols, diagrams or pictures. This fact 
undermines the claim that practical understanding is being able to apply a formula. 
(Schatzki 1997: 299)
To illustrate the point, Pleasants gives the example of riding a bicycle where successful 
riding cannot be reduced merely to following rules by the individual. Although successful 
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bike-riding might be described as being in ‘accordance with a rule’ since the cyclist has 
evidently mastered the problem of balance in line with the laws of gravity, the cyclist’s 
competence cannot be understood as the application of identifiable rules (Pleasants 1996: 
247-8). Competent cycling involves a series of social practices developed from the 
institution of road-using; cyclists should ride of on the left, near the pavement, but should 
use the centre of the lane when turning right. Yet it would be inadequate to reduce the 
social competence of cycling to rule-following since, an individual cyclist could interpret 
these rules differently. The practice of cycling cannot be reduced to rule-following; at best, 
the concept of rule-following in this case merely re-describes the phenomenon. 
Decisively, Schatzki forwards a second line of Wittgensteinian critique which is 
closely related to Bloor and Kripke’s position.
To begin with, Wittgenstein’s discussion of what it is to follow explicit 
formulations, in particular, his observation that words, etc.., taken by themselves 
can be systematically followed in indefinitely many ways (1958 sec 86, 139-141) 
shows that knowing how to go on can be modelled as understanding any formula 
you please so long as how people apply/follow it is suitably adjusted to match what 
they actually do. (Schatzki 1997: 299)
However apparently specific the rule, it could always theoretically be applied in a diversity 
of ways to produce quite random forms of action. For Schatzki and Pleasants, this 
argument is directly relevant to contemporary social theory. Giddens, Bourdieu, Bhaskar 
and Habermas, all employ a rule-individualist model; individuals follow rules (variously 
embodied in structure, habitus or purposive-rational codes) in order to engage in 
appropriate, system-reproducing action. The model seems plausible, even self-evident. Yet, 
if agents followed structure, habitus and codes as individuals, the most diverse forms of 
social practice could follow. In theory, individuals could follow the rules in a diversity of 
ways. The individual rule-following model provides an inadequate explanation for the 
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reproduction of the system. There is no reason internal to this approach why individuals 
should follow rules in common with others. The sceptical paradox demonstrates that the 
rule-individualism which characterises central currents in contemporary social theory is 
unsustainable. It cannot explain the phenomenon, structural reproduction, for which it is 
invoked.
The Structure of Social Action
I. Utilitarianism
Wittgenstein’s sceptical paradox has been rightly celebrated as a critical resource for 
theorists today. It represents a profound critique of individualism and it has been 
extensively drawn upon in current debates about structure and agency. His work has 
become the preferred reference point. However, although almost completely neglected, it 
may be possible to show that Wittgenstein’s critique was already evident in the work of 
Talcott Parsons and above all, The Structure of Social Action. In order to demonstrate this 
close – but often ignored - compatibility between Wittgenstein and Parsons, it is necessary 
to re-consider The Structure of Social Action in detail and to read the book against the grain 
of much current exegesis. In particular, the connection between the sceptical paradox and 
Parsons’ Utilitarian Dilemma needs to be elaborated and, in order to do this, it is vital that 
the central purpose of The Structure is established. The aim here of course is to affirm the 
kind of reading of The Structure proposed by Martindale (1971) and Schutz (1978). They 
see in The Structure the outline of an interactionist or phenomenological approach which 
prioritises collectively meaningful social action, upon which Parsons eventually reneged. 
The convergence can be achieved only if this interactionist reading of The Structure is 
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recovered.
The Structure of Social Action has two central goals, as commentators of all 
theoretical persuasions have noted. Firstly, it aimed to consolidate the philosophical 
groundings of sociology through tracing a convergence between four major theorists, 
Marshall, Pareto, Weber and Durkheim (Robertson and Turner 1991). Secondly, to achieve 
this end, The Structure of Social Action was primarily intended as a critique of utilitarian 
philosophy which Parsons believed was dominant in the social sciences at the time 
(Robertson and Turner 1991: 4); the work was also intended as a refutation of idealism but 
utilitarianism was the prime target. Parsons’ identification of utilitarianism as the focus of 
his critique in the Structure of Social Theory was perhaps unfortunate and has hindered the 
reception of the book. Moreover, it obscures the potential connection with Wittgenstein. As 
Charles Camic has noted (1979), Parsons’ interpretation of utilitarianism is an inaccurate 
account of the works of Bentham and Mill. Effectively, Parsons created a mythology in 
order to justify an alternative paradigm which he wanted to propound anyway (Camic 
1979). Camic has himself been criticized (Gould 1989) and Parsons’ strategy may not have 
been as purely rhetorical as Camic implies, however. Although Parsons employs the term 
utilitarianism, evidence suggests that, in fact, he referred not specifically to utilitarian 
philosophy itself but rather more broadly to individualism. Above all, he referred to the 
philosophical premises of economics with its rational economic actor. In places, Parsons 
clarified the point: ‘We feel that the prominence of this ‘individualistic’ strain in the 
treatment of want satisfaction and utility is a relic of history associated with economic 
theory’ (Parsons and Smelser 1956: 23; see Gerhardt 2005: 225). In addition, he also 
regarded the Darwinian evolutionism of Spencer as implicitly individualist.
Spencer was an extreme individualist. But his extremism was only the exaggeration 
of a deep-rooted belief that, stated roughly, at least in the prominent economic 
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phase of social life, we have been blest with an automatic, self-regulating 
mechanism which operated so that the pursuit by each individual of his self-interest 
and private ends would result in the greatest possible satisfaction of wants of all. 
(Parsons 1966: 4)
Individualists like Spencer falsely presume that rational individuals will necessarily 
converge on similar ends. This presumption was Parsons’ chief target in the The Structure. 
Indeed, Parsons explicitly identifies his target as individualism in the section, ‘The 
Utilitarian System’, in Chapter II. Instructively, he does not discuss Mill or Bentham, but 
describes, instead, the central place of individualism in ‘the Western European intellectual 
tradition since the Reformation’ (Parsons 1966: 52). Indeed, Parsons intriguingly argues 
that ‘probably the primary source of this individualistic cast of European thought lies in 
Christianity. In an ethical and religious sense, Christianity has always been deeply 
individualistic’ (Parsons 1966: 53). Arising from this cultural heritage, the philosophy 
which he describes as utilitarianism involves four basic features: ‘atomism, rationality, 
empiricism and randomness of ends will be called in the present study the utilitarian system 
of social theory’ (Parsons 1966: 60). The work of Mill and Bentham could not be so easily 
characterized by reference to these four features. The Structure is, in fact, a critique of 
individualism and should be read as such.2 Indeed, Parsons seems to be following 
Durkheim’s critique of utilitarianism which was similarly aimed at individualism (1969). 
Consequently, and in opposition to Camic, its critique of ‘utilitarianism’ is not arbitrary, 
utilized merely as a rhetorical device to justify a new paradigm. The work addresses a 
major strand in social thought in the early twentieth century. Parsons’ voluntaristic theory 
of action was intended to show, against the dominant individualist paradigm, that social 
order cannot be explained on an individualist account. Once it is recognised that Parsons 
2 If The Structure is read as a critique of individualism, the rejection of idealism becomes more coherent. 
Idealism is rejected because it represents another strand of individualist thought. On an idealist account, 
society is not reduced to individual choice but to individual belief. Social reality is defined by what an 
individual understands it to be. Parsons wanted to exorcise all individualist currents in early twentieth 
century thought and to focus instead on collective, social action.
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rejects individualism, not philosophical utilitarianism in The Structure, a rapprochement 
with Wittgenstein begins to be possible. Like Parsons, Wittgenstein’s later philosophy was 
similarly predicated on a rejection of individualism in relation to language usage and rule-
following. The fact that the two theorists addressed a similar problem in their working is 
important more exegetical work is required. 
II. The Unit Act
The Structure of Social Action begins with an analysis of the unit act which is central to the 
action frame of reference and therefore Parsons’ entire theoretical enterprise. 
For Parsons, the unit act consists of four elements; ‘an actor’, ‘an end’, a ‘situation’ and 
‘normative orientation’ (Parsons 1966: 44). By normative orientation, Parsons referred to 
the means which the actor selected in order to achieve the end. Crucially for Parson, the 
means was a normative phenomenon because it ‘must in some sense be subject to the 
influence of an independent, determinate selective factor’ (Parsons 1966: 44). In short, the 
actor must choose the means on the basis of subjective judgement. 
John Holmwood has been one of the most important commentators on the unit act 
and his interpretation of the act militates against any bridge between Parsons and 
Wittgenstein; he sees the two approaches as incompatible. Holmwood’s perspective must 
be overcome if the connection between Parsons and Wittgenstein is to be achieved. 
Holmwood has emphasised that the unit act does not represent a concrete, empirical fact. 
This would be to fall into the ‘fallacy of misplaced concreteness’, against which Parsons 
warned. Rather, according to Holmwood, the unit act is purely analytic. It is a useful 
theoretical fiction which does not have existence in reality. Isolated units do not exist and 
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cannot be identified. Rather the systems of which they are part have concrete existence: 
‘action systems have properties that are emergent only on a certain level of complexity in 
the relations of unit acts to each other. These properties cannot be identified in any single 
unit act considered apart from its relation to others in the same system. They cannot be 
derived by a process of direct generalisation of the properties of the unit act” (1966: 739). 
The system is an organic whole out of which singular unit acts are constituted and co-
ordinated; ‘the very definition of an organic whole is one within which the relations 
determine the properties of its parts. The properties of the whole are not simply a resultant 
of the latter’ (1966: 32). Crucially, the system is united as an organic whole through the 
functional interrelations of its parts. As evidence of this interpretation of The Structure, 
John Holmwood argues that: ‘Explanation…consists in generalising the conceptual scheme 
so as to bring out the functional relations in the facts already descriptively arranged’ (1966: 
49). On the basis of this evidence, Holmwood claims that ‘the idea of emergent properties 
of systems of social action is at the heart of how Parsons approached the “problem of 
order”. Action occurs in systems and these systems have an orderly character’ (Holmwood 
2006a: 8; 2006b:141-2). Although common culture is identified as important, Holmwood 
also maintains that power and coercion are fundamental to Parsons’ explanation of the 
social system. According to Holmwood, Parsons is a structural theorists for whom the 
system, sustained by power, coercion and common values, is orderly. The critical question 
for sociology, is how the orderly system harmonises its constituent and ‘analytical’ units 
acts into a coherent whole.
Holmwood’s reading is compelling in itself and, certainly, in the final chapter of 
The Structure, Parsons does begin to describe the social system as an institutional structure, 
of the kind to which Holmwood alludes. Moreover, Holmwood’s reading unifies Parsons’ 
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corpus into a single logical project. Throughout his early, middle and late periods, on this 
reading, Parsons always prioritised the social system as an organic functional whole in 
which unit acts should be situated; they were dependent empirically and explanatorily on 
the social whole. The problem here is that on this reading of The Structure, Parsons is 
plainly incompatible with Wittgenstein. Parsons was a system theorist from the outset, 
always dedicated to generalising theories of the kind which the later Wittgenstein 
disparaged. Parsons was never really interested in collective practice, action or 
understanding; rather he was a dedicated structuralist from the outset. As Holmwood has 
repeatedly and cogently emphasised (1996), Parsons, cannot, on this reading, be seen as an 
antidote to the dualistic tendencies of contemporary social theory (as I currently propose) 
but, on the contrary, as a progenitor of precisely the flawed dualistic generalising which is 
now so widespread. In order to continue with the project of reconciling Parsons with 
Wittgenstein – and using Parsons to reject contemporary social theory - it is necessary to 
propose an alternate interpretation of the unit act and therefore The Structure itself. 
The benefits of Holmwood’s reading are clear but it is not necessary to read the unit 
act in this way. Indeed, there are evident difficulties with Holmwood’s interpretation. 
Firstly, it is far from clear that Holmwood’s interpretation of the unit act as a merely 
analytical fiction is correct. Parsons states that the unit act can be employed at two different 
levels; ‘the “concrete” and the “analytical”. On the concrete level by a unit act is meant a 
concrete, actual act and by its ‘elements’ are meant the concrete entities that make it up’ 
(Parsons 1966: 48). Unit acts are concrete empirical events, potentially independent of any 
system; ‘the “smallest” unit which can be conceived of as concretely existing by itself is 
the “unit act”’ (Parsons 1966: 737). Indeed Parsons uses the example of a student handing 
in a paper to illustrate the unit act as a concrete event. Parsons defines his unit acts as 
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analytic rather than concrete for a number of different reasons. Firstly, he is not interested 
in explaining concrete historical acts; his project is to isolate the fundamental basis of all 
human action in order to establish sociology philosophically. Parsons wants to develop ‘a 
theoretical system built up upon observations of fact’ (Parsons 1966: 9) which will then 
have general relevance for all empirical analysis. The unit act takes an infinite number of 
forms but it is fundamental constituted by these four elements. Moreover, unlike the natural 
science, the ‘concrete unit act’ has some distinctive analytical features. It is possible to 
break physical material down into atoms; Parsons gives the example of a bridge which 
might be reduced to iron atoms (Parsons 1966: 47). The unit act has a different status. Its 
four elements represent a unity which cannot, in sociological terms, be divided because the 
conditions of action are partly defined by the normative orientation of the actor; the 
conditions cannot be separated from what actors take to be the conditions of action, unlike 
the organism and environment in biology. The unit act is analytical because it represents 
the smallest identifiable element of social action which sociology can recognise.  
Holmwood is completely correct that the relationship between the unit act and the 
system was a critical question for Parsons; Parsons notes that the question of the relation 
between the ‘particular concrete actor’ and ‘a total action system including a plurality of 
actors will be of cardinal importance’ (Parsons 1966:50-51). However, it is not at all clear 
that the passage, which Holmwood’s cites (1966: 739), demonstrates the ontological 
dependence of the unit act on the system, and therefore, Holmwood’s claims about the act’s 
purely analytical status. Indeed, Parsons’ himself described the relationship between the 
unit act and the emergent system of which it is part as ‘a methodological problem’ (Parsons 
1966: 740). This is clear in the opening chapter of the work. In initiating the work with the 
unit act, Parsons consciously sought to begin from a premise which he shared with 
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utilitarianism. Utilitarianism was also based on the unit act. The central difference between 
the individualism of utilitarianism and the sociology which Parsons advocated was that 
Parsons sought to explain how the unit acts were coordinated in order to produce a ‘system 
of ends’: the unification of a plurality of actors. The Structure did not presume that there 
was an already extant system which defined and co-ordinated unit acts, as Holmwood 
suggests. Rather, the work sought to demonstrate how potentially diverse unit acts are 
eventually unified around common goals in order to produce social order; that is, to 
generate and sustain a system (of ends). Indeed, although Parsons recognised that a social 
whole transcended its parts, he did not in The Structure, at least, invest this whole (the 
system of ends) with an ontological status distinct from the unit acts of which it was 
comprised. ‘to one actor, non-normative means and conditions are explicable in part, at 
least, only in terms of the normative elements of the actions of others in the system’ 
(Parsons 1966: 50).  The system consists, in the end, of a multitude of actor and unit acts. A 
multiplicity of unit acts – which collectively constituted a system – was fundamentally 
different from a single act and once formed such an organic system influenced what kind of 
unit acts could be performed. Nevertheless, the system of ends was ultimately just many 
interrelated unit acts. The fundamental problem for sociology, so far as Parsons was 
concerned was explaining how this diversity of unit acts could be harmonised into a 
system, whose powers as a unity transcended the acts of which it was comprised. Signally, 
for Parsons, although utilitarianism was founded on the concept of the unit act, as was his 
own approach, its conception of that act vitiated any explanation of the existence of this 
system of ends. A unit act defined in terms of atomism, rationality, empiricism and 
randomness of ends could not begin to provide an explanation of social order. 
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III. The Utilitarian Dilemma
In the famous discussion of utilitarian philosophy, Parsons examined the first formulation 
of this problem of order in Hobbes’ Leviathan and, from there, traced the various ways that 
modern philosophers had attempted to solve the problem of social order; that is, how they 
explained the co-ordination of unit acts (Parsons 1966, pp.90-125). Parsons began with the 
work of Hobbes not only because Hobbes was one of the first prominent modern political 
philosophers to grapple with the problem of grounding social order in rational, self-
interested individuals but, according to Parsons, ‘Hobbes’ system of social theory is almost 
a pure case of utilitarianism’ (Parsons 1966: 90). For Parsons, ‘Hobbes saw the problem 
with a clarity which has never been surpassed and his statement of it remains valid today’ 
(Parsons 1966: 93). The problem was that once the definition of humans as rational, self-
interested and autonomous individuals was accepted, the creation of social order became 
inexplicable (Parsons 1966: 93). In the end, Hobbes could only explain the creation of 
order out of the state of nature by appealing to the concept of Leviathan, the absolute 
sovereign, thereby contradicting the premises of utilitarianism. The Leviathan denied 
individuals any autonomy whatsoever. Parsons traces the same failure to overcome the 
Hobbesian problem in the works of Locke (Parsons, 1966: 96-7), Malthus (Parsons 1966: 
103-7), Godwin (Parsons 1966: 111-115), nineteenth century evolutionary theory and Marx 
(with less success) (Parsons 1966: 109-110). 
Parsons brilliantly noticed that the attempt to explain social order from the premise 
of rational, autonomous actors led to two unacceptable theoretical positions, which he 
called the ‘utilitarian dilemma’. 
Either the active agency of the actor in the choice of ends is an independent factor 
in action, and the end element must be random; or the objectionable implication of 
randomness is denied, but then their independence disappears and they are 
assimilated to the conditions of the situation, that is to elements analyzable in terms 
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of non-subjective categories, principally heredity and environment, in the analytical 
sense of biological theory. (Parsons 1966: 64)
If individuals really were rational and free as utilitarianism claimed, then the action of 
diverse individuals could never be coordinated. Their choices would remain random and no 
regular social intercourse could take place. There is no reason why independent individuals 
should pursue a common notion of utility. On the contrary, independent individuals would 
define their interests differently; they would pursue these diverse interests autonomously in 
any number of alternate ways. They could not and would not be able to co-operate with 
each other since each had objectives quite different from the other. It would be quite 
irrational for independent agents to collaborate. On a utilitarian account, social order would 
be impossible as individuals randomly pursue their own ends.
The utilitarian dilemma is a conceptual critique of individualism. It identifies the 
central contradiction of individualist thought. If human society consisted of individuals 
who were genuinely rational and independent, then, each individual could at any moment 
choose an alternative course of action. Predictable and repeatable action would be 
impossible; there could be no social order. If individuals chose their normative orientation 
in the unit act independently, then they would select a diversity of ends and means. They 
would not unite around common ends but each, consulting their own subjective judgement, 
would pursue their own independent interests in their own way. There would be no system 
of coordinated ends but mere randomness. Parsons’ does not discuss rules as such, but his 
‘utilitarians’ (individualists) replicate the same fallacy as Wittgenstein’s philosophers and 
his argument, therefore, accords with the sceptical paradox. For Parsons, individualism can 
logically lead only to randomness of ends; individuals would always choose their own 
ends. Individuals could not co-operate because there is no reason why independent agents 
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would follow pursue ends in common. Indeed, there would be significant motivations to 
follow their own interests and to act in ways most convenient and beneficial to them. 
Rational independent individuals would seek to free-ride and renege upon others and, 
consequently, it would be irrational to try and share ends. Co-ordinated social action would 
not occur; social order would be an impossibility. Similarly, for Wittgenstein, individualist 
premises can never produce coherent rule-following; individuals, referencing only their 
own practice, could apply the same rule in an infinite number of ways.  For both Parsons 
and Wittgenstein, coherent social action cannot be explained by reference to individuals 
independently choosing courses of action. The first horn of Parsons’ utilitarian dilemma 
bears a close resemblance to the sceptical paradox. In both, individualism is incapable of 
explaining coherent social practice. 
The utilitarian dilemma has been applauded as an ingenious critique of 
individualism but, like the sceptical paradox, the dilemma can be equally well applied to 
contemporary social theory. Indeed, in the work of Giddens and Bhaskar, the problem of 
coordination immanent to their individualist approach is explicitly recognised. Bhaskar and 
Giddens expend much effort in describing the structural pressures which channel individual 
action. However, at certain critical points in their writing, Bhaskar and Giddens assert that 
in any circumstance ‘the individual could have acted otherwise’ (Giddens 1976: 75; 
Bhaskar 1979: 114); individuals are always free to choose. Giddens and Bhaskar introduce 
this caveat in order to counter any suggestion of structural determinism. Giddens, in 
particular, wants to avoid any ‘derogation of the lay actor’. The emphasis on the individual 
usefully illustrates their position. Yet, Giddens and Bhaskar conveniently ignore the 
decisive theoretical implications of their individualism even though it is critical. If 
individuals are always free to do otherwise, then, theoretically, they can apply rules in any 
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way they chose. At any point, whatever the structural factors which confronted them, they 
could reasonably act in ways which were incompatible with social expectations. They 
could follow rules differently. Yet, in this case, the existing of a stable social system and its 
reproduction are fundamentally compromised. Ultimately, the social system is sustained by 
mere serendipity; individuals luckily choose to follow the rules in the same way. Giddens 
and Bhaskar illustrate the relevance of the utilitarian (or, more accurately, ‘individualist’) 
dilemma to contemporary social theory. They demonstrate precisely the fallacy of 
individualist accounts. The reproduction of the social system which these approaches 
presume reduces the process to individual voluntarism. On a voluntary basis, it is 
ultimately mere luck that individuals all choose to follow the rules in the same way. 
Of course, it is not absolutely impossible that social order could develop from 
random and free individual choices. It is theoretical possible that individuals could follow 
rules in the same way independently of each other. Yet, since the reproduction of major 
social institutions involves a multitude of actors and acts, it is almost inconceivable that it 
could plausibly be explained by reference merely to independent, individual choice. In this 
way, as a result of their individualism, Giddens and Bhaskar impale themselves on the first 
horn of Parsons’ utilitarian dilemma. On the presumption of individual autonomy, 
individuals would logically choose to follow their own ends; there is no factor inherent in 
this theoretical perspective that explains why individuals would co-ordinate their ends. 
That coherence is merely asserted and assumed. In fact, the randomness of ends follows 
logically from the premise of voluntarism or atomism. Like Parsons’ utilitarians, 
contemporary social theorists, such as Giddens, cannot account for the very phenomenon of 
systemic reproduction of which they purport to provide an explanation.
Wittgenstein and Parsons have compatible critiques of individualism. However, at 
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this point, although Wittgenstein’s critique of individualist accounts is far more developed 
philosophically, Parsons begins to transcend Wittgenstein in relation to current debates in 
social theory. In particular, Parsons recognizes that individualists are necessarily driven to 
the other horn of the utilitarian dilemma in their attempts to explain social order. In order to 
explain the co-ordination of ends, utilitarians (individualists) have, therefore, postulated the 
existence of some external factor which impresses itself upon individuals to direct their 
choices: ‘The only alternative on a positivistic basis in the explanation of action lies in the 
conditions of the situation of action objectively rather than subjectively considered’ 
(Parsons 1966: 67). In appealing to external conditions, utilitarians import a factor into 
their theory not originally envisaged by their premises. Typically, they appeal to the 
environment or heredity (biology), not originally included in utilitarian premises. More 
seriously, in appealing to objective factors to co-ordinate individual ends, utilitarianism is 
forced to contradict its premise of individual autonomy. In order for individuals to 
converge on shared ends, they must be determined by their biology or their environment. It 
is certainly true that individuals would no longer choose randomly under this external 
pressure; their choices would be co-ordinated to the same ends. Social order would then 
possible but only at the cost of individual autonomy. Utilitarianism must either assume that 
rational individuals are themselves determined by objective factors and, therefore, not 
independent or the autonomy of individuals is maintained, their choices are random and 
social order remains inexplicable. 
Although it is rarely recognized, a similar dynamic is evident in contemporary social 
theory. Contemporary social theorists recognise the problem of voluntarism and, 
consequently, while asserting the independence of the agent, they simultaneously and 
contradictorily assert the dependence of the actor on prior conditions. Actors may be free to 
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do otherwise but they are constrained by structural conditions; institutional factors limit 
their actions. 
Indeed, despite their appeal to voluntarism, neither Giddens nor Bhaskar presume that 
the social system could be a product merely of free choice as their claim, that the individual 
is always free to do otherwise, implies. Giddens and Bhaskar implicitly recognise the 
invalidity of their individual rule-following accounts. Both finally appeal to other factors 
which influence individual rule-following; they recognise structural constraint. Giddens, 
for instance, posits the internalisation of virtual orders of difference which pattern 
individual practice. According to Giddens, the virtual order of differences which 
individuals have internalised, at least partly unknowingly, patterns action independently of 
individual consciousness. Just as humans are able to speak without understanding linguistic 
structures, they are able to act appropriately without fully understanding the structures 
which pattern their actions. Although Giddens continually denies the implications of his 
approach, structuration theory involves determination at decisive points. Similarly, Bhaskar 
disparages Winch’s interpretivism and insists that some aspects of society are not reducible 
to participants’ understanding; ‘the conditions for phenomena (namely social activities as 
conceptualized in experience) exist intransitively and may therefore exist independently of 
their appropriate conceptualization’ (Bhaskar, 1979:66). Bhaskar emphasises the 
ontological autonomy of these intransitive aspects of society. Bhaskar claims that;
There is more to coping with social reality than coping with other people. There is 
coping with a whole host of social entities, including institutions, traditions, networks of 
relations and the like – which are irreducible to people 
(Bhaskar, 1991:71)
For instance, ‘being in prison or fighting in a war is not just (or even perhaps necessarily) 
possessing a certain idea of what one is doing’ (Bhaskar, 1979:174). On a realist model, 
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emergent properties impose upon individuals with structural force, compelling them into 
certain forms of action independently of their understanding.
This oscillation is particularly obvious in the work of Bourdieu where he describes 
a highly deterministic social theory but then denies the implications of this determinism. 
For instance, when questioned by Loic Wacquant about the criticisms made about the 
determinism of his habitus, Bourdieu has simply denied this determinism.
LW: You thus reject the deterministic schema sometimes attributed to you with the 
formula ‘structures produce habitus, which determine practices, which produce 
structures…that is, the idea that position in structure directly determines social 
strategy.
Circular and mechanical models of this kind are precisely what the notion of 
habitus is designed to help us destroy. (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p.134)
 
Bourdieu sees the habitus as allowing room for slippage so that it mediates between 
structure and individual practice, heavily constraining social action but not definitively 
determining it. Bourdieu efectively claims that sometimes individuals are determined and 
sometimes they are not. Bourdieu glosses over the critical issue to slide, as it suits him, 
from voluntarism to determinism. He is a perfect example of precisely the individualist 
social theorists which Parsons rejected in 1937. 
Contemporary social theorists are caught on the horns of a theoretical dilemma. 
Either they assert that individuals are always free to do otherwise or that structures 
condition them so that at least for some even a substantial part of the time, their actions are 
determined. As Parsons emphasised, both sides of this dilemma are equally objectionable. 
One on side, the existence of stable social institutions is inexplicable because individuals 
would randomly choose a variety of ends. On the other, human understanding is eliminated 
in favour of a mechanistic causal model. Contemporary social theory has not advanced 
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significantly beyond the individualist tradition, which Parsons rejected in the first half of 
the twentieth century. Wittgenstein’s sceptical paradox has constituted a rich resource for 
critics of contemporary social theory and, certainly, this paradox ably captures the 
individualist fallacies of current approaches. However, in purely sociological terms, 
Parsons’ utilitarian dilemma represents a more comprehensive critique of the current 
structure and agency debates. It incorporates the critique of individualism which is implicit 
in the sceptical paradox but also highlights the determinist route along which theorists are 
necessarily driven to escape the problem of voluntarism. Parsons represents a fuller critique 
of current problems in social theory.
Beyond Individualism
I. Forms of Life 
There is a surprising convergence between Wittgenstein’s sceptical paradox and Parsons’s 
utilitarian dilemma. Significantly, the way in which Wittgenstein and Parsons overcame the 
contradictions of individualist philosophy are also closely compatible. Wittgenstein 
recognised the fact that since coherent language-use occurred, there must be some 
phenomenon, not recognised by analytic philosophy, which allowed a word to gain a 
meaning in particular contexts. Famously, Wittgenstein claimed that co-ordinated rule-
following could be understood only so long as philosophy recognised the centrality of 
‘forms of life’ to human existence: ‘What has to be accepted, the given, is – so one could 
say – forms of life’ (Wittgenstein 1976: 226). The ‘form of life’ is a critical concept in 
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. Thus, he describes the form of life as the point at which ‘I 
have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned’ (Wittgenstein 1976: §217) or that ‘we come 
down to conventions’ (Wittgenstein 1989: 24). Wittgenstein is less than clear about what, 
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precisely, he means by the form of life. Indeed, David Bloor has emphasised the 
fragmentariness of Wittgenstein’s work; ‘I cannot escape the fact that as a 
sociological thinker he has only left incomplete fragments. For example, he told 
us in the Investigations that to follow a rule was an institution, but he did not 
spell out what he took an institution to be (see Wittgenstein, 1967: 199). Here 
we have a profound and suggestive insight but one that was not properly worked 
out’ (Bloor 2004: 594). Bloor here discusses rules but his comments might be 
equally well applied to the concept of the form of life. Given its apparent 
importance to Wittgenstein’s later writings, it is hopelessly underdeveloped. 
Nevertheless, despite Wittgenstein’s elipticism, many commentators have proposed 
an at least plausible interpretation. They have correlated the explicit comments about the 
form of life with Wittgenstein’s invocation of ‘usage’ (Wittgenstein 1976: §196 and §43) to 
conclude that the concept of the ‘form of life’ refers to concrete social practices: ‘for 
Wittgenstein ‘social practices are not, as they are in structuration theory, ‘mediating 
movement between two traditionally established dualisms in social theory. It is important 
to notice that Wittgenstein does not use the notion of practice as a superior kind of 
explanation, but rather, as a means which brings explanation to an end’ (Pleasants 1996: 
240). In order to engage in social practice, participants have to unify themselves around a 
collective understanding of what they are trying to achieve. Shared understandings become 
a co-ordinating point of reference for all the members of this group which allows them to 
go on. Participants understand their own and others’ acts by reference to these established 
understanding and it is on the basis of the meaningfulness of an act, in relation to these 
collective understandings that an act is described as rule-following or not. The collective 
understandings of the group which generate established patterns of practice render certain 
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kinds of action meaningful and therefore, definable as rule-following. Crucially, the spade 
is turned at the point of ‘conventions’ or shared understandings because these 
understandings are self-referential. The way participants define their collective practices is 
actually constitutive of them. 
II. Common Values
Parsons’ language dissuades readers from seeing any connection between Wittgenstein’s 
form of life and the arguments in The Structure of Social Action. Yet, a sociological 
concept, equivalent to the concept of the ‘form of life’ in definition and role, is evident in 
The Structure. The purpose of The Structure of Social Action is to show that a social theory 
capable of explaining the manifest fact of social order must transcend utilitarianism. At this 
point, Parsons invokes Kant’s transcendental argument.3 Kant argued that given the fact of 
experience it was possible to deduce the existence of a priori mental categories which made 
this experience possible. By extension, in The Structure, Parsons sought to identify some 
prior fact, ignored by utilitarianism, which made social order possible. For Parsons, social 
order can be explained only by reference to the existence of shared values. Common 
normative orientations provide the transcendental conditions for social order.
A society can only be subject to a legitimate order, and therefore can be on a non-
biological level something other than a balance of power of interests, only in so far 
as there are common value attitudes in the society. (Parsons 1966: 670; also Parsons 
1966: 392)
Social order is possible only insofar as participants have common values; they share an 
understanding of their common interests and goals. Yet, this agreement cannot be imposed 
externally independently of participants’ understandings; they have to recognise their goals 
and understand what actions they imply. Social action can occur only if it is ‘voluntaristic’. 
3 Munch (1982) has done most to demonstrate Parsons’ Kantianism; Rocher has emphasized the point 
(1974: ix).
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There has been extensive debate about the meaning of the concept ‘voluntaristic’ and it is 
necessary to recognise what Parsons means by the term in order to understand the 
significance of the concept of common values. Joas, for instance, has argued that the term 
‘voluntaristic’ refers to individual goal attainment in the action-frame of reference. 
Consequently, it is a return to precisely the utilitarian individualism which The Structure 
aimed to overcome (Joas 1996: 157-8). Yet, ‘voluntaristic’, here, does not have to be 
interpreted as meaning that individuals are free to choose any end which suits them. By 
voluntaristic, Parsons means not that individuals are free of all social constraint to choose 
to contribute to group ends or not as they please but, rather, that participants have to 
understand the significance of common values in order that they can commit themselves to 
them. 
In a letter to Frank Knight as early as 23 January 1933, which Camic has described 
as a ‘master key to Parsons’s thinking’ (Camic 1991: lv), Parsons was already explicit 
about the crucial role of understanding in any sociological explanation: ‘the social sciences 
cannot evade as all behaviourists try to a) the problem of the “subjective”;…b) the problem 
of the relations of ends and purposes both to the “ideal” sphere of “objective mind”, hence 
its role in conduct. In [this] the social sciences have a claim to be dealing with realities at 
least as ultimate as, at least as well attested as any “physical world”’ (Camic 1991: lx). The 
letter gives us an important insight into the concept of ‘voluntaristic’ in Parsons’ work. 
Shared understandings exist independently of any particular individual to have a decisive 
influence over individual action. Individuals in society do not independently develop their 
own understanding of themselves or their goals as they please. However, neither do shared 
values impose on humans independently of their consciousness, therefore. Participants 
have to understand what the common values, which they accept, collectively enjoin. These 
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values are collectively meaningful to them. However, humans are born into social groups 
and, consequently, there are many (even a majority of) cases where individuals have no 
choice about the common values to which they orient themselves; the values have 
‘objective existence’. The group, of which they are members or want to become members, 
is already committed to established goals, co-ordinated by long-held common values. Yet, 
even then, humans must understand what those common goals are and what actions the 
group’s values demand of them. Parsons seemed to have used the term voluntaristic rather 
than voluntary in order to communicate this difference between merely subjectively held 
opinions and collectively shared beliefs and values. Since all social action requires human 
understanding, Parsons calls it as voluntaristic. It requires the conscious understanding of 
group members about what their common values imply. 
It is important to be clear about what common values are and, in particular, to avoid 
the common mistake of presuming that they are merely abstract norms. Many critics have 
made precisely this error. Wrong (1961) and Gouldner (1970) have criticised Parsons’ 
concept of norms as referring to ungrounded moral imperatives. For these critics, 
individuals in Parsons’ work are ‘oversocialised’; they are motivated by communal values 
rather than individual need, consciousness and strategy. Individuals are too consensual and 
unrealistically self-less on this model. Cohen, Hazelrigg and Pope have famously rounded 
on Parsons’ concept of normative orientation and have argued that his use of Weber to 
prioritize norms is opportunistic (Cohen et al. 1975: 231). Weber’s sociology is not limited 
to values but recognises that ‘factual regularities of subjectively meaningful behaviour…
could result from a variety of conditions…habituation, wage, customs…self-interest’ 
(Cohen et al 1975: 240); that is ‘non-normative elements’ (Cohen et al. 1975: 240). 
Although Parsons uses the perhaps unfortunate term ‘common values’, Parsons’s 
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voluntaristic theory of action is not simply about norms, as general ethical principles. On 
the contrary, in The Structure of Social Action, common value attitudes were indivisible 
from action – and specifically from collective, social action, as the title of his work implies. 
Indeed, in his reply to Cohen et al., Parsons emphasised the point. He recognised that 
Weber did not reduce social reality to norms. However, on his reading, normative 
orientations (different forms of rationality) were constitutive of the historically diverse 
institutions which Weber studied (Parsons 1976: 362). Decisively, Parsons described 
common values as ‘binding commitments’ for participants which are ‘crucial for stable 
legitimate orders and institutions… and also for customs and usages’ (Parsons 1976: 362) 
Parsons refers to precisely those activities – customs and usages - which Cohen et al accuse 
him of ignoring. This allows for a quite different reading of Parsons. In order to engage in 
coherent social practice, including these customs and usages from which arise major social 
institutions, participants need to unite themselves around a common concept of means and 
ends; they need to share values. Victor Lidz has affirmed the point: ‘When he did treat 
values as important causal factors, he had in mind institutions that are structural to society, 
not just personal values judgments of individuals’ (Lidz 1989: 571). Parsons’ values are 
then inseparable from social action; they are constitutive of them. Indeed, even in the 
earliest discussion of the unit act, he emphasised this point, describing the organic role 
which the normative orientation played in uniting the act. Common values represent 
bedrock for Parsons, at which point his spade is turned, but common values are not mere 
ideals; they refer to the concrete social actions constituted by the shared understandings of 
participants. In this way, Parsons’ common values and Wittgenstein’s forms of life are 
closely compatible concepts, displacing individual rationality with collective practice. 
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III. Honour and Shame
Wittgenstein’s pointed to the fruitful concept of the form of life but he never began to 
address the sociological question of why humans make such prodigious efforts to 
participate in collective activities or to abide by their conventions rather than choose 
individualistic courses of action. He never began to explore why the shared understandings 
which humans recognise become obliging to them, even at great inconvenience to 
themselves. It is here that Parsons begins to transcend Wittgenstein sociologically. He 
offers a sociological explanation of why individuals adhere to common values – or forms 
of life. Crucially, Parsons identifies the mechanisms of honour and shame which are central 
to human social interaction.
The significance of honour and shame emerges in Parsons’ discussion of the moral 
obligation imposed by accepting common values. Although the establishment of common 
values and goals requires a conscious act of understanding, shared norms imply moral 
obligation; adherence to them is not an individual matter of choice (Parsons 1966: 383-4). 
Using Durkheim’s famous discussion of Kant’s concept of the categorical imperative 
(Durkheim 1965), Parsons describes the mutually obligatory nature of social life.
A moral rule is not moral unless it is accepted as obligatory, unless the attitude towards 
it is quite different from expediency. But at the same time it is also not truly moral 
unless obedience to it is held to be desirable, unless the individual’s happiness and self-
fulfilment are bound up with it. Only the combination of these two elements gives a 
complete account of the nature of morality. 
(Parsons 1966: 387)
The members of a social group must abide by its morals, even if it is against their 
immediate self-interest. Distinctively, however, these rules are not imposed upon group 
members unwillingly. On the contrary, as Parsons notes, an ‘individual’s happiness and 
self-fulfilment’ are dependent upon their abiding by these morals. In fact, Parsons’ writing 
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is somewhat unfortunate in The Structure since he potentially individualises Durkheim’s 
point, referring to Freudian processes of internalization (Parsons 1966: 388). There is a 
danger here than moral rules become expedient once again. He implies that individuals 
abide by them because their obedience made them individually happy. If individual 
happiness was the key criteria of morality, this is little safeguard, as Kant recognized, 
because it might make an individually equally or even more happy to fail to abide by a 
moral. For Durkheim, individuals did not abide by morals because it gratified them 
personally; he was in complete agreement with Kant’s deontological position. Self-
fulfillment was not an internal good generated independently by actors; self-fulfillment was 
itself a collective good dependent upon the group. For Durkheim, individuals were able to 
feel happy and fulfilled insofar as their conduct was approved by their fellow group 
members. Humans feel fulfilled in so far as they are held in esteem by their group; these 
‘collective sentiments’ explained ‘the characteristic of sacredness which is attributed to 
moral facts’ (Durkheim 1965: 38). This desire for collective recognition then explains the 
curiously visceral force of moral injunctions (against Kant’s abstract rationalism). People 
commit themselves to the shared goals of their group and are held to those goals because 
approbation from their fellows is a tangible good in itself, inspiring contentment and 
pleasure, while the disdain of colleagues is viewed with dread. 
Parsons does not explore the further point sufficiently, focusing only the individual 
motivation to adhere to the collective goals of the group. However, the desire for honour 
and aversion to shame plays a fundamental role in social interaction. Critically, members of 
social groups gain manifest collective benefits. By co-operating with others, individuals are 
able to enjoy goods which would be impossible for them to create alone. Historically, 
groups have provided their members with food, shelter, economic opportunities, 
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companionship, entertainment and security which individuals could never enjoy alone. 
However, these collective benefits involve enforceable obligations on those who would be 
group members. Group members’ access to the collective goods of the group is 
substantially a function of the esteem in which they are held by the group. Consequently, 
the higher the honour in which a person is held, the greater their access to the collective 
benefits produced by co-operation, while shame will lead to limited access and finally to 
exclusion; group members will not co-operate with a shamed individual. On this account, 
the threat of randomness of ends is obviated because participants are compelled to orient 
themselves to common goals. They are forced to co-operate. Certainly, they can still refuse 
to co-operate and pursue their own individualistic course but, in so doing, they subject 
themselves to serious and, perhaps, disastrous sanctions; they are excluded. At the same 
time, the danger of objectivism is also avoided because individuals must understand the 
significance of their common values and the ends to which they point. Moreover, the 
compulsion to co-operate does not derive from external objective factors but from the 
group itself whose members mutually monitor each others’ activities, interpreting whether 
participants contribute to the collective good. Social order is dependent on participants’ 
shared understandings of the group’s collective goals. Yet, groups have powerful 
mechanisms of shame and honour which sustain and, indeed, enforce co-operation. 
Once common values are interpreted in this way, Martindale’s claim, that Parsons 
was a ‘social behaviourist’, and Schutz’s argument, that Parsons failed to sustain his 
original commitment to subjective meaning displayed in The Structure, become clear. More 
specifically, read in this way, it becomes possible to build a bridge between the early 
Parsons and later Wittgenstein. Underpinning all forms of social action are the shared 
understandings of the participants which allows them to unite, co-operate and co-ordinate 
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themselves. On this account, Parsons is not an abstract systems theorist, as he would later 
become. On the contrary, he proposes a form of sociology compatible with the 
interactionist tradition, found originally in Durkheim. He is concerned with elucidating the 
conditions in which coherent social practice is possible. His answer is that social action is 
possible so long as participants develop shared understandings. Once understood in these 
terms, the unlikely connection between Parsons and Wittgenstein can begin to be 
recognised. Wittgenstein similarly rejected philosophers’ ‘craving for generality’ in favour 
of the analysis of concrete language games and specific word usage. However, not only did 
Parsons provided an account of social reality – and the way it should be studied, 
commensurate with Wittgenstein, but he provided an explanation of why humans would be 
motivated to engage in collective enterprises. He identified the bed-rock of human social 
existence; a fundamental requirement and drive to co-operate with others, impelled by 
social mechanisms of honour and shame.
Conclusion
In current debates in social theory, Ludwig Wittgenstein has proved to be an immensely 
fertile intellectual resource. His later work on rule-following has informed both the widely 
espoused structure and agency paradigm and, interestingly, been the source for the critics of 
this paradigm. For commentators, like Schatzki, Pleasants and Turner, the sceptical paradox 
has been utilised to demonstrate that coherent social reality could not exist on the 
presumptions of structure and agency. Rule-following can never delimit a social practice 
and were individual action to be limited merely to rule-following, no coherent practice 
would be possible. Wittgenstein’s influence has been prodigious. Yet this influence has 
come at a cost as other intellectual sources and traditions have been ignored. The work of 
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Talcott Parsons is the prime example here. The academy has been afflicted by collective 
‘amnesia’ (Gould 1989: 649). It has forgotten Parsons. This amnesia has been deeply 
detrimental to sociology. Holmwood’s argument (1996) might be revised to claim that, 
precisely because they have forgotten early Parsons, contemporary social theorists are 
condemned to repeat the errors of the generalising theory which typified Parsons’ middle 
and later periods; they remain trapped within the structure and agency paradigm.
The Structure of Social Action features a critique of individualist social thought 
which is closely compatible with Wittgenstein’s sceptical paradox. The utilitarian dilemma 
is less elaborated philosophically but as a tool for rejecting individualism, it follows the 
same argument as the paradox. Moreover, the utilitarian dilemma and the argument, which 
develops from it, have evident sociological advantages over Wittgenstein. Parsons 
recognised that individualist theories necessarily oscillated to an unsustainable determinism 
in order to explain social order. This oscillation is directly relevant to contemporary social 
theory where an often furtive, ambiguous appeal to determinism appears at convenient 
points in the argument. Alternatively, in some cases, contemporary theorists actively 
disparage individual consciousness and commit themselves to social determinism. The 
sociological superiority of Parsons does not stop here. 
Against individualising theories, both Wittgenstein and Parsons recognise the 
distinctive nature of social action. In order to engage in coherent activity, humans unify 
themselves around shared understandings; they unite around a common definition of what 
they are trying to achieve. Once this common agreement in a form of life or around 
common values is recognised, social action can be comprehended without a retreat into 
individualism or the derogation of the lay actor. Decisively, and quite absent from 
Wittgenstein’s interests, Parsons tries to explain why individuals would orient themselves 
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to shared understandings and be obligated to act in a way which is accordance with them. 
Humans require collective goods created by the groups of which they are members; access 
to those collective goods is monitored by other participants in terms of honour and shame. 
Consequently, out of fear of exclusion, humans are obligated to abide by the norms to 
which they agree; they are compelled to engage in coherent social practice. In the Structure 
of Social Action, Parsons declared that, ‘It is hoped, in transcending the positivist-idealist 
dilemma, to show a way of transcending also the old individualism-society organism or, as 
it is often called, social nominalism-realism dilemma which has plagued social theory to so 
little purpose for so long’ (Parsons 1966a: 74). It would be possible to replace the phrase 
‘individualism-society organism’ with structure and agency and to claim that, with his 
voluntaristic theory of action, he had, in fact, achieved his goal. It has taken sociologists 
sixty years and the intervention of Wittgenstein to realize it. 
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